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Article 5

Ethical Issues
in the Use of Human Subjects
Stanley Hauerwas

The author is a faculty member in the University of Notre Dame
department of theology. He is the author of the recently published
book, Truthfulness and Tragedy, which was reviewed in the May issue
of Linacre.

1. The Variety of Ethical Analysis
The ethical issues surrounding human experimentation are complex
and, I suspect, some of them are irresolvable. I am going to try to
describe how ethicists tend to frame the ethical concerns involved in
the experimental use of human subjects. However, I must ask you to
keep in mind that there is no ethically neutral way to describe a moral
problem. Indeed the very designation of a "problem" depends on
prior moral presuppositions. For example, different positions concerning the use of human subjects are often thought to be determined by
whether a deontological or teleological pattern of moral justifications
is dominant. Yet this very way of construing the dispute may conceal
a more fundamental disagreement about how to describe morally what
human experimentation involves. Thus while I am trying to act primarily as a reporter, you should suspect that my commitments color
the way I describe the ethical issues involved in the use of human
subjects in research.
2. Protection of the Individual Versus the Benefit to Mankind
Perhaps the most basic as well as the most heated issue surrounding
the use of human subjects in research is the assumption by some that
the primary ethical question is whether the benefits of any research
are sufficient to justify certain risks to the subject. In other words
many in the research community seem to assume that the question of
the moral justification of research on human beings is a matter of
providing more information about comparative benefits and risks. The
experiment is thought justified if it has been carefully designed and
can be shown that the actual or potential benefit outweighs the risk.
Others, however, have argued that this way of stating the moral
issue is to already beg the principal moral question. They argue that
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the teleological assumption - that is the idea that the good consequences outweigh the bad - involved in this kind of ethical costbenefit analysis fails to do justice to the basic commitm ent to respect
and protect each human person. Put differently , it is argued that no
amount of benefit can ever justify using one person as a m eans for the
good of others. Those who assume that the ethical issu e is one of
balancing some risks against future goods fail to see, therefore , that
respect for the integrity of the individual cannot be balanced by the
benefits gained - no m atter how the benefits might be understood.
Thus Jay Katz argues that what must be recognized is that there is an
inherent value conflict in the conduct of human research - "the quest
for the acquisition of knowledge for the benefit of present and futurEi!
generations on the one hand ; and the respect for the dignity,
autonomy, and inviolability (unless consented to) of the subjects of
research." 1
Those who argue that the protection of the human subject is the
overriding ethical issue for human experimentation do not intend this
demand to deny any u se of human subjects in research. Rather they
argue that any experiment must provide proper safeguards for the
human subject. If such safeguards cannot be provided, then the experiment cannot be done even if it would have great benefit for present
and future generations. Ethically this means that no basic value can be
overridden for a higher good except if it can be shown that another
basic value is at stake. For those who see themselves serving the future
of mankind through the office of science, this position appears
unduly restrictive.
If the Conference on Experiments and Research with Humans sponsored by the National Academy of Science in 1975 2 was any example,
I am afraid that we have a long way to go before t his conflict is
resolved. (Moreover, it is hard to see how we can expect it to be solved
in this context when it h as not been resolved at the level of ethical
theory.) For neither side seems to be able to speak to the con cerns of
the other. Scientists cann ot understand how anyone can fail to appreciate the benefits to be gained through science for the good of mankind. Talk of the " inviolability of the individual" appears as an
irrational commitment that is holding back important d evelopments
for the cure of disease or opening up new vistas of human understanding.
Those concerned with the protection of human subjects as t he overriding value, however, tend to think that research scientists naively
assume that what is good for science is also good for mankind. Just as
what is good for business is n ot necessarily good for America, they
argue that the assumed importance of science for human betterment,
both morally and materially, must be shown rather than simply
asserted. F or scientists often seem to assum e that their activity can be
justified on the simple utilitarian grounds of the greatest good for the
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greatest number. Yet utilitarianism as an ethical theory remains problematic because it fails to account for some of our central intuitions
about what we can justly do and not do .
Even though I am sympathetic with those who have argued for the
priority of protection of the human subject, I think they have not as
yet provided convincing grounds for their allegiance to the individual.
Ramsey's contention that "no man is good enough to experiment
upon another without his consent," 3 seems to strike a chord within
us, but it is not clear why this is the case. Of course it is possible to
argue within the framework of liberal political theory that we simply
have a " right" not to be subjected to the interests of others. This
response continues to assume that we have a clear idea of what
"rights" involve or how they can be justified. But this is not the case.
As Alastair MacIntyre has recently observed, "It is an interesting
paradox that those eighteenth century writers such as Jefferson or
Robespierre who believed that they intuited timeless truths about the
rights of man did so in a vocabulary that had historically come into
existence as a child of late medieval legal usage and which does not
seem to be found in the precise senses in which they used it until a
hundred and fifty years or so before their own time. But it is easy to
understand why it did emerge as a central moral as well as legal concept. The central preoccupation of both ancient and m edieval communities was characteristically: how may men together realize the true
human good? The central preoccupation of modern men is and has
been characteristically: how may we prevent men interfering with
each other as each of us goes about our own concerns? The classical
view begins with the community of the polis and with the individual
viewed as having no moral identity apart from the communities of
kinship and citizenship; the modern view begins with the con cept of a
collection of individuals and the problem of how out of and by individuals social institutions can be constructed. "4
If MacIntyre is right about this, and I think he is, then in an interesting way the appeal to "rights" to protect research subjects presupposes the same individualistic presuppo sitions as utilitarianism . This
may reveal that, while appearing antagonistic, the debate between the
teleologist and deontologist on this issue may be a debate between
brothers. Or, more accurately, it helps us see that to construe the issue
of the use of human subjects in terms of a choice between teleological
or deontological ethical theories is misleading. For the issue is what
kind of risks should we as citizens and recipients of the benefits of
health science be willing to undergo to furth er the general well-being
of our community.
But if this is the right way to frame the question it cannot be
answered in terms of the current discussion, but rather must await the
development of a new sense of political com munity and resulting
political and ethical theory. For only then can we stand back from
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abstractions such as "the good of mankind" or "the rights of the
individual" and be clear about what ends and values science can and
should serve. With the articulation of such-ends we may well find the
grounds to say why each of us should be willing to serve as research
subjects for the good, not of mankind, but of the communities in
which we exist.5 Because we do not share these values, however, the
only way we feel that we can protect ourselves from one another is by
insisting on the procedural rule of informed consent. In other words,
what we have here is the typical liberal strategy to substitute procedure for the absence of debate on substantive norms and values.
3. Therapeutic and Non-Therapeutic Experimentation
It can be objected that I have overstated the unclarity of the moral
values and ends that give direction to contemporary research. To be
sure, there is an important distinction between therapeutic and nontherapeutic experimentation that suggests we have a clearer idea of
what we are doing in therapeutic cases. But we also know that this
distinction is often easier to draw in theory than it is in practice. For
example, there are good grounds to think, in spite of the wide practice
of kidney transplants, that such procedure is still an experimental
technique. 6 Furthermore, it remains unclear if random clinical trials
should be viewed as therapeutic or non-therapeutic even though medical progress depends on such testing.7 For the issue is: medical
progress for whom - the immediately sick person or future patient
populations?
The question of who the doctor's patient is or should be is often
not easy to determine, but it is complicated by the realization that we
are no longer sure what health and illness mean. As Charles Fried has
suggested, "The concept of good health implies a concept of the good
life, and the goodness of life includes a large number of other factors
besides simply its length."8 Thus the doctor's primary duty is not the
prevention of death, but rather the preservation of bodily integrity
necessary for the realization of a reasonable and realistic life plan. 9
But we have little consensus about what kind of medicine should be
developed since we are unclear what constitutes a "reasonable and
realistic life plan." But concretely this means we have no way of
determining whether we should develop heart transplant procedures in
order to provide some with opportunities not normally thought to be
a possibility. For the expense of providing those opportunities for
some must lessen basic medical care for others.
Even if we knew better what health means or should mean it is
unclear how this would help us direct the research not directly associated with therapeutic ends. For example, some of the hard cases
involving the use of human subjects in research are clearly non-therapeutic - that is the research aims to obtain information of use to
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others and thus does not pretend to treat some illness that the experimental subject might have. Thus the justification for using human
subjects in such research is made more intense because the design and
ends of such experiments are remote from the therapeutic context.
4. Informed Consent
Of course many assume that the requirement of "informed consent" is a sufficient safeguard to protect subjects involved in therapeutic and non-therapeutic experimentation. Informed consent at
least means that the doctor or the experimenter must give the subject
the facts necessary to make an informed choice. That means that if
the subject is ill he must have a clear sense of the diagnosis of his
illness and the prognosis without treatment. Also the patient must
have an idea of the benefits and risks of the treatment as well as the
hazards and advantages of alternative forms of treatment.
Fried summarizes the rules that define informed consent as : "1) A
fair explanation of the procedures to be followed, and their purposes,
including identification of any procedures which are experimental;
2) A description of the attendant discomforts and risks reasonably to
be expected; 3) A description of any benefits reasonably to be
expected; 4) A disclosure of any appropriate alternative procedures
that might be advantageous for the subject; 5) An offer to answer any
inquiries concerning the procedures; and 6) An instruction that the
subject is free to withdraw his consent and to discontinue participation in the project activity at any time." 10
As it stands, this sounds fine, and it surely acts as a break on some
of the abuses that might occur if we did not require it. The problem,
however, with informed consent being used as the overriding justification criterion for experimentation is that few believe it is really possible to obtain. For many doctors, informed consent is that slip of
paper that is a necessary (but as we have discovered, not sufficient)
condition to avoid malpractice. But even if the doctor or researcher is
committed to informed consent it is not clear if it describes a genuine
choice. As a famous heart surgeon once told me, for a patient to make
an informed decision to undergo heart surgery would mean he would
have to study with him for at least three years (and that was assuming
the patient had completed medical school). Though this certainly
overstates the case, one may still ask whether informed consent is a
workable moral requirement.
Even if informed consent were a clear possibility it is still not a
sufficient condition to justify human experimentation. In some form
or other, informed consent is probably a necessary condition for the
use of human subjects, but simply because some may consent to make
themselves subject to an experiment does not mean that they should
so consent. For persons can misuse themselves even if they do so
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voluntarily and with full knowledge. There are some things that we
should not do to ourselves even for the good of others. To absolutize
inform ed consent does not resolve the issue of whether we ought to
allow ourselves to be subjected to certain kinds of risks in the name of
human good.
Nor should this kind of problem be limited to those experiments
which involve the greater physical risk to the subject. Indeed, I think
that the issue is even m ore important in relation to the kind of experiments in the social and psychological sciences where deception is
necessary t o the experimental design. It is important to rem ember that
we can morally harm without physically hurting.
Even if we can make informed consent a workable criterion for
human experimentation there remains the problem of what we do
about particular test populations. Should prisoners or the poor be
subj ected to human experimentation? Many argue that because of
their disadvantaged positio n any informed consent they might give, in
spite of elaborate safeguards, is inherently coercive. However , Katz
suggests that this attitude, especially toward the poor, betrays a
stereotypical and degrading view of them.ll To be sure, it may be
necessary to exercise special care in respect to prisoners and the poor,
but to deny them the opportunity to participate in the joint venture
of our community to better our condition is to deny them the respect
due them . (The situation of the poor may be significantly different
than that of prisoners, h owever, insofar as the latter have no power to
protect themselves. This may also be important in the use of students
in research for while they appear free, they are in fact in a disadvantaged position since their future depends on being able to please
professors. At the very least, this means that the manner of obtaining
informed consent is very important in contexts where the one consenting lacks the power to withstand the suggestion that he volunteer.
This is especially the case when the "power" is un articulated and
informal.)
Of course, for this last point to be viable depends on the actual
existence of that joint venture. Yet, in fact, we know that doctors and
medical researchers have gone to great lengths to avoid exposing the
general population to the risks necessary for m edical advances. This is
not the place to speculate about the reasons for this, though I suspect
it has much to do with the paternalistic attempt of doctors to protect
us from the risks involved in normal m edicine, but until medical
experimentation is seen as an opportunity - and perhaps even an obligation - for everyone, I find it hard to justify the continued use of
prisoners and the poor as experimental subjects. Moreover, if we were
willing to widen the opportunity for more people to participate in
scientific research, it would necessitate the healthy development of
making the scientific community take the time to explain what they
are about. Or put more positively, it would help us see the stake we all
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have, and the risks we should assume, for the development of certain
kinds of research.
The ethical issues raised by the use of prisoners and the poor seem
simple when compared to the problems involved in the use of children
and other non-competents. In order to develop certain kinds of drugs
or procedures we can do all the animal and adult testing we want and
still we must finally test on children - i.e., a test group who by definition cannot give informed consent. Paul Ramsey has argued that no
one, parent or guardian, even with the best intentions, has the moral
status to consent for a child to be made the subject of medical investigation solely for the accumulation of knowledge (except when epidemic conditions prevail). To quote: "When there is no possible relation to the child's recovery, a child is not to be made a mere object in
medical experimentation for the good to come." 12 If it is objected
that this severely restricts possible advances in childhood medicine,
Ramsey argues that the moral progress of the race is more important
than the scientific. Thus, testing on children is the paradigm instance
that at times it may be necessary to choose between morality and
knowledge even though we normally assume that we do not have to
choose between them.
(Without developing it I at least want to suggest that not enough
attention has been paid to the ethical issues involved in using animals
in research. It may well be that we will learn more about what moral
issues are involved in human research if we think more about our
assumption that we can subject animals to almost any peril or pain for
the good of men. Our inhumanity to our fellow man may well be a
correlative to our unjustified insensitivity to those not of our species. )13
5. The Basis of Informed Consent
In conclusion I think it is interesting to ask why we have come to
think that informed consent is so important. Above I have quoted
Ramsey to the effect that no man is good enough to experiment upon
another without his consent, but it is not clear why this is the case. Of
course many would argue that no man has the right to force another
to do what he does not want to even if it will have positive benefits
for others. In the framework of the libertarian political ethic this
response has some plausibility, but as I suggested this assumes an
individualistic assumption that avoids asking what ends medicines and
collateral research ought to serve.
In this connection Charles Fried's recent analysis of the basis of
informed consent seems to me to be particularly suggestive and illuminating. 14 Fried argues that our commitment to the individual subject
is based on the idea that the ethical life is primarily anchored in the
concrete relationships in which we are involved. In other words, Fried
suggests that the sense of care we should have for others is not based
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on impersonal moral principles, but grows out of our more or less
direct commitment to particular significant others. Thus we feel that
we have obligations to our wives, children, and friends, which are
qualitatively different from obligations to those with whom we are
not in such relationship. Moreover, we feel that whatever our obligations to a stranger may be, they cannot override our obligation to
those with whom we share a special relationship. If Fried is right, our
obligation to the stranger is based on our prior commitment to particular friendships.
Fried goes on to argue that the kind of relationship between a doctor
and his patient is of this primary sort. Thus the ethos of medicine
assures the patient that the doctor's concern for him or her is absolute
- that is it would be immoral for the doctor ever to lower the quality
of care of one patient for the good of another even if the "another"
were a greater number. The requirement of informed and free consent
for therapeutic as well as experimental procedures refers to one
attempt to safeguard our fundamental commitment, then to primary
relationships. It is to be noted therefore that the concern with the
"rights" of the human subject is not necessarily based on the inviolability of the individual, but rather grounded on the community possible between those who wish to be friends.
But if Fried has properly identified the relationship which underwrites the doctor's sense of commitment to each individual patient, it
must be asked how this commitment translates into the non-therapeutic experimental context? If this is not the kind of relationship
between the scientist and the human subject then even more careful
procedures must be developed in the research context to protect the
subject. For we must see that what we have is not a joint venture for
medical progress or human goods secured through such progress, but a
relationship between strangers in which one side has been given more
power than the other in the name of science.
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